by Mazibuko K. Jara and Sally Peberdy
Part I: Executive Summary
1. The civil society response to the xenophobic violence of May 2008 in Cape Town was an effective channel that harnessed resources, provided food, shelter, and other material help, pressured government, mobilised hundreds of people as conscious volunteer, sought and managed donations from the public, and triggered renewed political consciousness and action in response to the xenophobic violence and subsequent displacement of people in the city. In the first days of the crisis, civil society essentially replaced the absent, incapable and dysfunctional state. In subsequent weeks and months it continued to provide humanitarian assistance, monitor conditions in the displacement camps and advocate for the rights of migrants challenging the state when it failed to meet basic minimum standards of care.
2. The wave of xenophobic violence that swept South Africa started on 11 May 2008 in Alexandra, Johannesburg. On 22 May attacks started in earnest in the Western Cape. In the following four days between 20,000-30,000 people were displaced in Cape Town following violence and threats. Thousands of others left the city. Almost all were black Africans from the rest of the continent but Indian, Pakistani and Chinese nationals were also affected. Violence occurred across the city, but mainly in informal settlements and townships. Smaller towns in the Western Cape were also affected.
3. The violence sits against the backdrop of a city marked by spatially and racially expressed deep socio-economic inequalities which reproduce apartheid geographies. In South Africa’s second largest city with a population of over 3 million, most working class and poor black and coloured residents live in overcrowded, under-serviced marginalised townships and informal settlements often far from economic and employment opportunities. Despite its relatively strong economy, in 2001 unemployment rates in informal settlements ranged from 50-60%. In 2005, nearly 40% of the population of Cape Town lived below the poverty line and 400,000 households lacked adequate formal housing. The situation has been exacerbated by insertion into the global economy, economic recession and neo-liberal economic and urban policies.
4. In the last 30 years the socio-economic geography of Cape Town has undergone major change as a result of internal migration. Since the removal of its status as a Coloured Labour Preference Area in 1985 over 800,000 black South Africans (mainly from the Eastern Cape) have moved to the city. Cross border migration from the rest of the continent has progressed at a slower pace, perhaps because of distance and the city’s history. There is no way of knowing how many foreigners live in Cape Town. Census 2001 found only 3% of the population were born outside South Africa and 1.2% in other African countries. These figures account for those who avoided enumeration and recent movements from Zimbabwe and elsewhere. African cross border migrants come from across the continent and include migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants. They work in elementary occupations and the service sector, are entrepreneurs, professionals and students.
5. The origins of the violence were symptomatic of wider problems in the South African socio-economic and political environment and not just xenophobia. The violence was seen to be underpinned by long-standing and unchallenged xenophobic attitudes and discrimination; lack of social cohesion and tolerance of diversity; perceived competition for resources in the face of deep inequality, poverty and slow service delivery; lack of leadership and competition for power in communities; lack of effective communication between the state and communities; a ‘culture of impunity’ in the use of violence to resolve disputes and crimes against foreigners; and exclusion of foreigners from participation in civil society; and a state which has been complicit in the victimisation of foreigners in part through its denial of the problem. A unique and longstanding feature of xenophobic violence in Cape Town has been its association with protecting the interests of South African shopkeepers in townships and informal settlements (e.g., Masiphumelele, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha).
6. Displaced African migrants and refugees fled to shelters provided by civil society, police stations and community halls. Many lost their homes, possessions, jobs, and businesses and children missed school. The city set up six camps to which some people were moved immediately and to which others were moved over the following weeks. With the exception of Youngsfield Military Base all were located at the edge of the city and far from peoples’ home and work. The policy of consolidating displaced people in camps (mega-sites), and conditions in the camps, was controversial and divisive. The experience of violence and displacement was gendered.
7. Civil society in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGOs/NPOs), Christian, Jewish and Muslim faith based organisations (FBOs), refugee and migrant organisations, COSATU and the SAHRC played a pivotal role in the response to the violence. They provided humanitarian, advocacy and legal assistance, sustaining the basic needs of displaced people even after the city and provincial governments had ostensibly started to act. One important attribute of the civil society response in Cape Town was how the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) brought to bear its well-organised social presence and a more advanced lobbying and advocacy strategy linked to using the law. The UNHCR played a significant role in the establishment and maintenance of the camps and their dissolution. The reponse of civil society can be characterised as humanitarian. Attempts to challenge xenophobia and wider issues underpinning the violence were limited. Legal challenges to improve conditions in camps and activities challenging xenophobia were controversial and created points of cleavage. The ANC, the SACP, the DA and other political parties were largely absent. The ANC seems to have played a contradictory role in different localities, at times possibly being active in the xenophobic violence and in others the contrary seems to be the case.
8. Tension between the city and the province hampered the impact of the civil society effort. For a month the Western Cape and Cape Town Disaster Management teams worked separately although both responded. However, not only was the state slow to respond at provincial and city levels it was at times obstructive reflecting the nature of the South African state as xenophobic, dysfunctional and ineffective. In retrospect, the state appreciates the role played by civil society. Since the crisis subsided from September 2008, the provincial government has developed a humanitarian assistance framework. However, it has not addressed its core failures in response to the crisis and migration issues in general.
9. Civil society participated in seven committees/forums formed during the crisis to facilitate and coordinate the response. Only one survives. Legacies include strengthened relationships between organisations and cooperation between ILRIG, COSATU and the Ogoni Solidarity Forum to organise migrant workers. One of the most direct outcomes was the formation of the Social Justice Coalition (SJC). This was built on the back of significant social and political capital accumulated over 10 years of social mobilisation and other campaigning work done by the TAC. However, it has not sustained its initial momentum. Successful coalitions seem to need clear and accessible goals around which to initiate concrete campaigns.
10. Despite the impressive levels of civil society intervention, there is little integration of xenophobia and integration of migrant and refugee issues or migrants themselves in work done by the majority of civil society organisations in Cape Town – except among the limited number of organisations which were already working with migrants and refugees and refugee organisations. The majority of these efforts are limited when viewed against the systemic foundations of xenophobia.
11. The Treatment Action Campaign played a massive role in the response of civil society to the xenophobic violence of May 2008, not only in its own activities but in coordinating the response of civil society. For the first few days their disaster relief operation was the main and largest response to the crisis in the city. Key features of their role included: initiating the establishment of, and leading a broader civil society task team; responding to developments in the camps and government (municipal and provincial) decisions and failures; interacting with “refugee leadership”, other NPOs, the government and media; mobilising thousands of its members; organising public political action; ensuring international standards were met in the camps.
12. The response of TAC, and particularly its Khayelitsha District branch reflect the importance of principles – promotion of and respect for social equality, human rights and dignity; consultation with displaced people; giving displaced people a voice; and operating in a culture of non-violence to effective humanitarian response which because it does not only look at “basic needs” but addresses the socio-economic and political context is most effective. Furthermore, the role of the TAC branch in Khayelitsha in the response demonstrates the importance of having organisations which are rooted in communities as well as “what a group of organised citizens can do.” However, it should be noted that their response caused tensions among sections of the organisation who were concerned that the core work of the organisation was being lost as well as between TAC and some other civil society organisations who felt the role they played was too politicised and too strong.
13. Masiphumelele is a poor and small township and informal settlement close to wealthy Fishoek and Noordhoek and the previously coloured township of Ocean View in the southern Peninsula. It is a fraught locality with high unemployment, low incomes and where over 90% of households live in informal dwellings. It demonstrates how the social crisis of reproduction is located in working class zones. The importance of small business associations and the targeting of Somali shopkeepers indicate how circuits of capital are also of concern. Masiphumelele experienced violence in 2006 as well as in 2008. The experience of reconciliation in 2006/7 while it did not prevent the violence of 2008, meant that the attacks in 2008 were short-lived and the displaced people were among the first to return to their homes, invited to by a delegation of community leaders Masiphumelele. Unlike many other communities in Cape Town, the ANC, the ANCYL, the YCL and the SACP have a history of good anti-xenophobia activism in Masiphumelele, but it is not universally supported in each of these organisations.
14. Civil society responded by meeting humanitarian needs of displaced people and advocating to ensure minimum standards of care and to protect the rights of the displaced. Attempts to develop a more progressive politicised activist response to challenge xenophobia were controversial reflecting the characterisation of the crisis by most of civil society and government as a humanitarian disaster. Yet this characterisation to the need to reflect on the underpinnings of the humanitarian crisis caused by the xenophobic violence in May 2008 and the effectiveness of solely relying on a humanitarian response. The response highlighted a general lack of integration of citizens and foreigners within civil society organisations and their activities. Many of the issues raised by this exploration of the response of civil society to the xenophobic violence point to lessons to be learned about mobilisation for social change on a wider scale and provides points where South Africans and foreigners can act together. These issues include lack of social cohesion, intolerance of diversity lack of progressive activist organisation and leadership to channel the voices and frustrations of communities, and disturbingly high levels of violence in poor communities, which sit against the deep inequalities, marginalisation and poverty found in South African urban areas, the reproduction of neo-apartheid urban geographies.
15. The report is based on research undertaken in 2009. It involved a review of relevant literature and newspapers, interviews with members of civil society organisations and provincial and city government involved in the response as well as focus group discussions with TAC members and community members in Masiphumelele.
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