Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban

Xenophobia and Civil Society:
Durban’s Structured Social Divisions

University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society

Baruti Amisi, Patrick Bond, Nokuthula Cele, Rebecca Hinely, Faith ka Manzi, Welcome Mwelase, Orlean Naidoo, Trevor Ngwane, Samantha Shwarer, Sheperd Zvavanhu


‘…fears about migrants taking the jobs or lowering the wages of local people, placing an unwelcome burden on local services, or costing the taxpayer money, are generally exaggerated.’
Helen Clark, Administrator, UN Development Programme
2009 Human Development Report –
Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development,
New York, UNDP, p.v

‘The response is for each and every stratum in society to use whatever powers of domination it can command (money, political influence, even violence) to try to seal itself off (or seal off others judged undesirable) in fragments of space within which processes of reproduction of social distinctions can be jealously protected.’
David Harvey, Consciousness and the Urban Experience,
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985, pp.13-14

Part I: Executive Summary

1. Describing xenophobic outbreaks and documenting the way local civil society responds are useful tasks for a journalist, but insufficient for critical scholars. What is required is to understand the profound structural crises associated with low-income communities in Durban that help contextualise the recent surge of xenophobic sentiments, and that also provide clues for long-term, bottom-up antidotes. These crises are being addressed only up to a point by Durban civil society. They have their roots in market and state failures that appear to be beyond the capacity of local organisations which are mainly equipped to do local advocacy, service delivery and in rare cases political solidarity. These failures include:

• extremely high unemployment which exacerbates traditional and new migrancy patterns;
• a tight housing market with residential stratification, exacerbating service delivery problems (water/sanitation, electricity and other municipal services);
• extreme retail business competition;
• world-leading crime rates;
• corruption in the Home Affairs Department and other state agencies in a manner detrimental to perceptions regarding immigrants;
• cultural conflicts; and
• severe regional geopolitical stresses, particularly in relation to Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.

2. Because they did not tackle these root problems head on, Durban civil society organisations band-aided the local manifestations of xenophobia only in the short-run and only up to a point. As the case studies of community/church responses in Durban during 2008-09 show, the structural terrain for renewed conflict – probably in the wake of the 2010 World Cup - remains relatively undisturbed. Durable socio-economic and ‘local geopolitical’ problems remain as challenges for more visionary civil society strategists. Some of these can be found in sites like Chatsworth in South Durban, where the Bottlebrush shack settlement was one of Durban’s most brutal sites of displacement in part because of civil society organising failures over prior years. In other neighbourhoods which serve as case studies – Cato Manor and Cato Crest, the Central Business District and Umbilo – there are equally sobering lessons about the limits of social organising during a ‘moral panic’ such as xenophobia, at this stage of Durban civil society’s maturation. Ironically, there are hints of visionary breakthrough in several relationships established by regional (Southern African) organisations, including the celebrated solidarity expressed during the April 2008 dockworker refusal to unload three million bullets and weaponry destined for Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. There is hope for post-xenophobic Durban civil society, but only if we work through the processes that have taken us from here to here.

3. Although there are many issues that are important to address, the central problems we believe that can be tackled through public policy and civil society activities alike, are unemployment and the exclusion of the lower classes of society from access to adequate and secure living space. Whereas economic managers long ago introduced a dichotomy between living and working spaces, with ‘The Durban System’ amongst the most sophisticated of migrant labour schemes, this was an artificial division, one which xenophobic attacks traversed by allowing resentments born and kept alive in the workplace to be expressed in places of residence. Blame for xenophobic attacks thus generated should be placed squarely at the door of the economic and political leadership who, from the early 1990s, determined that post-apartheid arrangements would perpetuate and even exacerbate the social divisions associated with migrant labour. Moreover, by placing limits on what Durban civil society can legitimately ‘demand’ (and in the process by excluding mass employment, housing for all, and an end to migrancy), the elites limited the ability of working-class people to respond to the problems the declining economy visits upon them. Amongst the limits are the character of working-class leadership, the politics and organizational forms they can generate, their ideology and struggle strategies/tactics, and their alliances.

4. In this context, we believe the structural problems that have adversely affected jammed Durban’s low-income people – thus contributing to long-term xenophobic attitudinal norms – can be summarised as follows, with suggested recommendations for mitigation:

Workshop Dates and Venues:

South African civil society response to the xenophobic violence of May 2008

Date: 3rd February 2010
Time: 8.30am to 5pm
Venue: The Wedgwood
75A 2nd Ave, Melville

Date: 10th February 2010
Time: 08.30 to 5pm
CDRA, 52/54 Francis Street
Woodstock, Cape Town

Date: 27th February 2010
Time: 09.30 to 4pm
UKZN, Howard College Campus
Durban

For more information contact: alison@jabulitos.co.za

Responses to Xenophobic Violence in Alexandra

Towards Addressing the Root Causes of Social Tensions:
Evaluating Civil Society and Local Government Responses to Xenophobic Violence in Alexandra

Luke Sinwell
and
Neo Podi

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Executive Summary
1. Alexandra, a poverty stricken township 20 kilometers to the north east of Johannesburg, was the first to witness the wave of violence against foreign nationals, which later spread to other townships across the country in May 2008. Drawing from 19 in-depth interviews with a wide range of leaders and other residents in Alexandra, this article seeks to understand the strengths and weaknesses of local government and civil society responses to the xenophobic violence in Alexandra. Paying particular attention to the ways in which local government and civil society responded to the attacks, this article challenges recent analyses which suggest that government is necessarily better placed to counteract xenophobic attitudes and to prevent these attitudes from becoming violent. It then argues that while local government and civil society have been relatively effective in the short-term, to counteract the violence, in the medium-term their efforts to instill a culture of tolerance have only been partially successful as xenophobic attitudes clearly remain strong in Alexandra. The findings also suggest that any plan to develop tolerance of foreigners must take place alongside a programme that addresses the crisis of poverty, housing and unemployment. Placing hope in the Alexandra Renewal Project (ARP), leaders have failed to undertake an immediate programme to alleviate the social conditions such as poverty and unemployment that leaders themselves declare make Alexandra ripe for violence.

Visible and Vulnerable

Asian migrant communities in South Africa

Yoon Jung Park,
and
Pragna Rugunanan

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
Overview of Findings
1. While it is clearly the black African migrant in South Africa who suffers the brunt of violent xenophobic attacks, diverse populations of Asian migrants are becoming increasingly vulnerable and more susceptible to xenophobic attacks. Sporadic accounts of these attacks appear in the print media; however, many of the stories go unrecorded.

2. At present, there are at least 350,000 people of Chinese descent, and approximately 70,000 – 100,000 Pakistanis, a further 55,000 – 60,000 Bangladeshis, as well as a large influx of new migrants from India in South Africa. For a variety of reasons, these Asian migrants to South Africa seem to fly under the ‘radar’ of most migration and refugee groups; those involved in the protection and study of migrants seem to focus little, if any, attention on Asian migrants. These migrants from various parts of Asia are not the primary targets of xenophobic violence; however, there have been increases in the numbers of violent incidents involving Asian, particularly Bangladeshi shopkeepers, in the past few years. In addition, those interviewed reported high levels of other forms of discrimination.

3. For Asian migrants, particularly those engaged in retail sectors, the most serious and chronic problems reported were crime and corruption. Asian migrants feel that they are targeted by corrupt officials and criminals alike for extortion and robbery. One of our informants reported, “We are their ATMS; whenever they are short of cash, they come to us!” It is not yet clear whether the robberies and break-ins are xenophobic in nature or simply opportunistic crimes targeting vulnerable ‘soft targets’ in the retail sector. However, there does seem to be a type of racial profiling whereby corrupt officials specifically target Asian migrants for extortion, in part because of their engagement in the lower end retail trades (and cash), but also because of the perception that many within these communities have tenuous legal status and are willing to pay bribes. Regardless of legal status or even citizenship, Asian migrants as well as South Africans of Asian descent are increasingly harassed by corrupt officials.

4. In addition to problems with crime and extortion, many respondents also indicated that there were simmering tensions between groups within both the broader South Asian communities and the Chinese communities. Pakistanis, in particular, indicated that there were both tensions with the local Indian South African community and within factions of the Pakistani community. Interestingly, these intra-group tensions were viewed as more salient than discrimination from within broader South African society. There were also reports of inter-migrant group hostilities (migrant-on-migrant tensions) as well as examples of cooperation between migrant groups.

5. Findings of this study reveal a complete lack of civil society organisations in the Bangladeshi migrant community in Johannesburg; the recent launch of the first-ever Pakistani community body in Johannesburg; and a large number and variety of civil society groups in the various Chinese communities around the country. The xenophobic attacks of May-June 2008 elicited fear in all of these communities; several respondents indicated that ‘this time, they were spared’. Overall, the Chinese communities seem to feel particularly fearful and vulnerable after the xenophobic attacks. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in Johannesburg while more cautious and alert to possible xenophobic attacks after May 2008, on the whole, were overwhelmingly content with their South African experiences and regard this country as one of immense opportunities.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESPONSES TO THE XENOPHOBIA

A CASE STUDY OF THE SOWETO ELECTRICITY CRISIS COMMITTEE,
THE ANTI-PRIVATIZATION FORUM
&
THE COALITION AGAINST XENOPHOBIA

Trevor Ngwane & Nonhlanhla Vilakazi

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
1. An investigation into how three social movement organisations responded to the xenophobia violence that broke out in South Africa in May 2008 reveals that participation in such organisations by ordinary working class people makes them to be less xenophobic and even likely to help the victims of xenophobia rather than join in the attacks. Members of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee and the Anti-Privatisation Forum were positioned by their organisations prior to the xenophobia attacks to respond in a progressive way to these. These two organisations were also central in the formation of the Coalition Against Xenophobia that publicly united different civil society organisations against xenophobia. However, the response of individual members appears to vary according to how well their organisation provides leadership, education and guidance to its members, among other factors. The SECC seemed to provide the most systematic and consistent influence and activity around these issues and its members were the most active and for longer than the other APF affiliates in organising against xenophobia and reaching out to the victims.

2. Political understanding provides the ideological framework within which individuals evaluate the world and respond to its challenges. Alternatively an undeveloped political understanding or consciousness opens a person to being swayed by the self-serving and circular arguments of the xenophobes. Membership in a social movement organisation and adherence to a progressive political philosophy or position, such as revolutionary Pan Africanism or democratic socialism, tends to provide individual social actors with an ideological foundation for opposing attacks against African immigrants in a country like South Africa. Preventative work is very important in the battle against xenophobia. Progressive political education including programmes that accentuate a feeling of solidarity between people from different countries discourages the acquisition of xenophobic attitudes and greatly reduces the likelihood that the person will join in xenophobic violence. Such programmes are best organised by social movement organisations with a progressive leadership; wish such leaders more likely to challenge, persuade and win over members who have caught the xenophobia virus. A vision of a new kind of society where all are treated equally and with respect irrespective of race, creed, sex, sexual orientation or country of origin, where all forms of oppression and exploitation, including xenophobia, have been eradicated, is necessary to inspire and guide the struggle against xenophobia. This is because the analysis of the social movements studied suggests that it is the capitalist system itself, its history and its nature that is at the root of xenophobia. Competition, individualism, divide and rule, colonialism, racism, tribalism and apartheid were all seen as closely related to the development of the capitalist system. From this point of view, the struggle against xenophobia is a struggle against the capitalist system itself.

Khutsong and xenophobic violence

Exploring the case of the dog that didn’t bark
Joshua Kirshner
Comfort Phokela


University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
1. Early accounts of the xenophobic violence that swept across South Africa’s townships in May 2008 suggested a link between high levels of poverty and violence towards foreign migrants, who were seen to be encroaching on the already limited resources of the locals. Political analysts, the media and academics alike turned their attention to the ‘hotspots’ of the bloodshed, notably Alexandra, but what was overlooked in this process was the townships, like Khutsong, where no incidents of xenophobic hostility were recorded. While it may seem peculiar to ask questions about why there were no brutal attacks on foreign migrants in some townships—particularly when several analysts are rushing to understand why there was—probing into why there were no attacks on immigrants in Khutsong offers insights into the response of South African civil society to the xenophobic violence of May 2008.

2. This article examines three issues that are of central concern to the question of why there were no attacks on immigrants in Khutsong in May 2008. The first of these relates to the way in which material demands were framed. In Khutsong, a protracted cross-border demarcation dispute was couched within the discourse of poor service delivery, and the target of the residents’ anger was the local government rather than the presence of foreign migrants. Second, the border dispute emphasized a notion of belonging that grants primacy to provincial boundaries (regardless of residents’ citizenship status or place of origin), whereas elsewhere, insiders and outsiders were distinguished, in large part, on the basis of their nationality. The third issue relates to the role of local leadership in giving direction to and shaping the attitudes and behaviour of residents. This study suggests that local leaders were decisive in the border dispute and in stemming the violence against foreign nationals in May 2008.

3. The following are key issues and recommendations for strengthening civil society responses to ongoing threats of xenophobia and challenges of local development in Khutsong.

COSATU’s Responses to Xenophobia

Mondli Hlatshwayo

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
1. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is an essential part of South African civil society because it is has the largest representation of organised workers and also a history of struggle against apartheid in the workplace and the townships. The democratic dispensation and post-apartheid era pose political and organisational challenges for COSATU and its affiliates. Besides a necessity to organise vulnerable workers in the “formal” and “informal” economy, it also has to address the question of xenophobia and issues pertaining to the rights of migrant workers. Migrant workers also form part of the category of vulnerable workers in the “formal” and “informal” economy.

2. The research findings demonstrate that certain COSATU’s provincial structures, through defending the human rights of migrants, played an important role in providing humanitarian aid to victims of xenophobia in May last year. The challenge is that COSATU and its affiliates did not have a co-ordinated intervention during the xenophobic attacks last years. This would have assisted in pushing back the frontiers of xenophobia. With all its limitations, the federation and its affiliates also appealed to its members and the society at large to defend the human rights of migrants. Despite the International Trade Union Confederation – African Regional Organisation (ICFTU-AFRO) report which indicates that unions are duty bound to organize migrants and safeguard their rights and interests , COSATU has not developed a strategy for organising migrants . On a positive note, the recent COSATU Congress Resolution on xenophobia opens space for developing a platform for protecting the rights of migrants and migrant workers. This research has also revealed that there are individual shop stewards and organisers who are acting as key defenders of the rights of migrants workers. They are driven by the spirit of international solidarity which is one of the founding principles of COSATU. It is the duty of COSATU as a federation to generalise the good deeds of these individuals. This would be part of entrenching its principle of international solidarity “within the South African borders”.