xenophobia2008

Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban

2010-01-27T03:50:00.000-08:00

Xenophobia and Civil Society:
Durban’s Structured Social Divisions

University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society

Baruti Amisi, Patrick Bond, Nokuthula Cele, Rebecca Hinely, Faith ka Manzi, Welcome Mwelase, Orlean Naidoo, Trevor Ngwane, Samantha Shwarer, Sheperd Zvavanhu

‘…fears about migrants taking the jobs or lowering the wages of local people, placing an unwelcome burden on local services, or costing the taxpayer money, are generally exaggerated.’
Helen Clark, Administrator, UN Development Programme
2009 Human Development Report –
Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development,
New York, UNDP, p.v

‘The response is for each and every stratum in society to use whatever powers of domination it can command (money, political influence, even violence) to try to seal itself off (or seal off others judged undesirable) in fragments of space within which processes of reproduction of social distinctions can be jealously protected.’
David Harvey, Consciousness and the Urban Experience,
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985, pp.13-14

Part I: Executive Summary

1. Describing xenophobic outbreaks and documenting the way local civil society responds are useful tasks for a journalist, but insufficient for critical scholars. What is required is to understand the profound structural crises associated with low-income communities in Durban that help contextualise the recent surge of xenophobic sentiments, and that also provide clues for long-term, bottom-up antidotes. These crises are being addressed only up to a point by Durban civil society. They have their roots in market and state failures that appear to be beyond the capacity of local organisations which are mainly equipped to do local advocacy, service delivery and in rare cases political solidarity. These failures include:

• extremely high unemployment which exacerbates traditional and new migrancy patterns;
• a tight housing market with residential stratification, exacerbating service delivery problems (water/sanitation, electricity and other municipal services);
• extreme retail business competition;
• world-leading crime rates;
• corruption in the Home Affairs Department and other state agencies in a manner detrimental to perceptions regarding immigrants;
• cultural conflicts; and
• severe regional geopolitical stresses, particularly in relation to Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.

2. Because they did not tackle these root problems head on, Durban civil society organisations band-aided the local manifestations of xenophobia only in the short-run and only up to a point. As the case studies of community/church responses in Durban during 2008-09 show, the structural terrain for renewed conflict – probably in the wake of the 2010 World Cup - remains relatively undisturbed. Durable socio-economic and ‘local geopolitical’ problems remain as challenges for more visionary civil society strategists. Some of these can be found in sites like Chatsworth in South Durban, where the Bottlebrush shack settlement was one of Durban’s most brutal sites of displacement in part because of civil society organising failures over prior years. In other neighbourhoods which serve as case studies – Cato Manor and Cato Crest, the Central Business District and Umbilo – there are equally sobering lessons about the limits of social organising during a ‘moral panic’ such as xenophobia, at this stage of Durban civil society’s maturation. Ironically, there are hints of visionary breakthrough in several relationships established by regional (Southern African) organisations, including the celebrated solidarity expressed during the April 2008 dockworker refusal to unload three million bullets and weaponry destined for Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. There is hope for post-xenophobic Durban civil society, but only if we work through the processes that have taken us from here to here.

3. Although there are many issues that are important to address, the central problems we believe that can be tackled through public policy and civil society activities alike, are unemployment and the exclusion of the lower classes of society from access to adequate and secure living space. Whereas economic managers long ago introduced a dichotomy between living and working spaces, with ‘The Durban System’ amongst the most sophisticated of migrant labour schemes, this was an artificial division, one which xenophobic attacks traversed by allowing resentments born and kept alive in the workplace to be expressed in places of residence. Blame for xenophobic attacks thus generated should be placed squarely at the door of the economic and political leadership who, from the early 1990s, determined that post-apartheid arrangements would perpetuate and even exacerbate the social divisions associated with migrant labour. Moreover, by placing limits on what Durban civil society can legitimately ‘demand’ (and in the process by excluding mass employment, housing for all, and an end to migrancy), the elites limited the ability of working-class people to respond to the problems the declining economy visits upon them. Amongst the limits are the character of working-class leadership, the politics and organizational forms they can generate, their ideology and struggle strategies/tactics, and their alliances.

4. In this context, we believe the structural problems that have adversely affected jammed Durban’s low-income people – thus contributing to long-term xenophobic attitudinal norms – can be summarised as follows, with suggested recommendations for mitigation:

Workshop Dates and Venues:

2010-01-27T03:14:00.000-08:00

South African civil society response to the xenophobic violence of May 2008

Date: 3rd February 2010
Time: 8.30am to 5pm
Venue: The Wedgwood
75A 2nd Ave, Melville

Date: 10th February 2010
Time: 08.30 to 5pm
CDRA, 52/54 Francis Street
Woodstock, Cape Town

Date: 27th February 2010
Time: 09.30 to 4pm
UKZN, Howard College Campus
Durban

For more information contact: alison@jabulitos.co.za

Responses to Xenophobic Violence in Alexandra

2010-01-27T03:02:00.000-08:00

Towards Addressing the Root Causes of Social Tensions:
Evaluating Civil Society and Local Government Responses to Xenophobic Violence in Alexandra

Luke Sinwell
and
Neo Podi

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Executive Summary
1. Alexandra, a poverty stricken township 20 kilometers to the north east of Johannesburg, was the first to witness the wave of violence against foreign nationals, which later spread to other townships across the country in May 2008. Drawing from 19 in-depth interviews with a wide range of leaders and other residents in Alexandra, this article seeks to understand the strengths and weaknesses of local government and civil society responses to the xenophobic violence in Alexandra. Paying particular attention to the ways in which local government and civil society responded to the attacks, this article challenges recent analyses which suggest that government is necessarily better placed to counteract xenophobic attitudes and to prevent these attitudes from becoming violent. It then argues that while local government and civil society have been relatively effective in the short-term, to counteract the violence, in the medium-term their efforts to instill a culture of tolerance have only been partially successful as xenophobic attitudes clearly remain strong in Alexandra. The findings also suggest that any plan to develop tolerance of foreigners must take place alongside a programme that addresses the crisis of poverty, housing and unemployment. Placing hope in the Alexandra Renewal Project (ARP), leaders have failed to undertake an immediate programme to alleviate the social conditions such as poverty and unemployment that leaders themselves declare make Alexandra ripe for violence.

Visible and Vulnerable

2010-01-27T03:00:00.000-08:00

Asian migrant communities in South Africa

Yoon Jung Park,
and
Pragna Rugunanan

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
Overview of Findings
1. While it is clearly the black African migrant in South Africa who suffers the brunt of violent xenophobic attacks, diverse populations of Asian migrants are becoming increasingly vulnerable and more susceptible to xenophobic attacks. Sporadic accounts of these attacks appear in the print media; however, many of the stories go unrecorded.

2. At present, there are at least 350,000 people of Chinese descent, and approximately 70,000 – 100,000 Pakistanis, a further 55,000 – 60,000 Bangladeshis, as well as a large influx of new migrants from India in South Africa. For a variety of reasons, these Asian migrants to South Africa seem to fly under the ‘radar’ of most migration and refugee groups; those involved in the protection and study of migrants seem to focus little, if any, attention on Asian migrants. These migrants from various parts of Asia are not the primary targets of xenophobic violence; however, there have been increases in the numbers of violent incidents involving Asian, particularly Bangladeshi shopkeepers, in the past few years. In addition, those interviewed reported high levels of other forms of discrimination.

3. For Asian migrants, particularly those engaged in retail sectors, the most serious and chronic problems reported were crime and corruption. Asian migrants feel that they are targeted by corrupt officials and criminals alike for extortion and robbery. One of our informants reported, “We are their ATMS; whenever they are short of cash, they come to us!” It is not yet clear whether the robberies and break-ins are xenophobic in nature or simply opportunistic crimes targeting vulnerable ‘soft targets’ in the retail sector. However, there does seem to be a type of racial profiling whereby corrupt officials specifically target Asian migrants for extortion, in part because of their engagement in the lower end retail trades (and cash), but also because of the perception that many within these communities have tenuous legal status and are willing to pay bribes. Regardless of legal status or even citizenship, Asian migrants as well as South Africans of Asian descent are increasingly harassed by corrupt officials.

4. In addition to problems with crime and extortion, many respondents also indicated that there were simmering tensions between groups within both the broader South Asian communities and the Chinese communities. Pakistanis, in particular, indicated that there were both tensions with the local Indian South African community and within factions of the Pakistani community. Interestingly, these intra-group tensions were viewed as more salient than discrimination from within broader South African society. There were also reports of inter-migrant group hostilities (migrant-on-migrant tensions) as well as examples of cooperation between migrant groups.

5. Findings of this study reveal a complete lack of civil society organisations in the Bangladeshi migrant community in Johannesburg; the recent launch of the first-ever Pakistani community body in Johannesburg; and a large number and variety of civil society groups in the various Chinese communities around the country. The xenophobic attacks of May-June 2008 elicited fear in all of these communities; several respondents indicated that ‘this time, they were spared’. Overall, the Chinese communities seem to feel particularly fearful and vulnerable after the xenophobic attacks. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in Johannesburg while more cautious and alert to possible xenophobic attacks after May 2008, on the whole, were overwhelmingly content with their South African experiences and regard this country as one of immense opportunities.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESPONSES TO THE XENOPHOBIA

2010-01-27T02:55:00.000-08:00

A CASE STUDY OF THE SOWETO ELECTRICITY CRISIS COMMITTEE,
THE ANTI-PRIVATIZATION FORUM
&
THE COALITION AGAINST XENOPHOBIA

Trevor Ngwane & Nonhlanhla Vilakazi

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
1. An investigation into how three social movement organisations responded to the xenophobia violence that broke out in South Africa in May 2008 reveals that participation in such organisations by ordinary working class people makes them to be less xenophobic and even likely to help the victims of xenophobia rather than join in the attacks. Members of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee and the Anti-Privatisation Forum were positioned by their organisations prior to the xenophobia attacks to respond in a progressive way to these. These two organisations were also central in the formation of the Coalition Against Xenophobia that publicly united different civil society organisations against xenophobia. However, the response of individual members appears to vary according to how well their organisation provides leadership, education and guidance to its members, among other factors. The SECC seemed to provide the most systematic and consistent influence and activity around these issues and its members were the most active and for longer than the other APF affiliates in organising against xenophobia and reaching out to the victims.

2. Political understanding provides the ideological framework within which individuals evaluate the world and respond to its challenges. Alternatively an undeveloped political understanding or consciousness opens a person to being swayed by the self-serving and circular arguments of the xenophobes. Membership in a social movement organisation and adherence to a progressive political philosophy or position, such as revolutionary Pan Africanism or democratic socialism, tends to provide individual social actors with an ideological foundation for opposing attacks against African immigrants in a country like South Africa. Preventative work is very important in the battle against xenophobia. Progressive political education including programmes that accentuate a feeling of solidarity between people from different countries discourages the acquisition of xenophobic attitudes and greatly reduces the likelihood that the person will join in xenophobic violence. Such programmes are best organised by social movement organisations with a progressive leadership; wish such leaders more likely to challenge, persuade and win over members who have caught the xenophobia virus. A vision of a new kind of society where all are treated equally and with respect irrespective of race, creed, sex, sexual orientation or country of origin, where all forms of oppression and exploitation, including xenophobia, have been eradicated, is necessary to inspire and guide the struggle against xenophobia. This is because the analysis of the social movements studied suggests that it is the capitalist system itself, its history and its nature that is at the root of xenophobia. Competition, individualism, divide and rule, colonialism, racism, tribalism and apartheid were all seen as closely related to the development of the capitalist system. From this point of view, the struggle against xenophobia is a struggle against the capitalist system itself.

Khutsong and xenophobic violence

2010-01-27T02:45:00.000-08:00

Exploring the case of the dog that didn’t bark
Joshua Kirshner
Comfort Phokela

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
1. Early accounts of the xenophobic violence that swept across South Africa’s townships in May 2008 suggested a link between high levels of poverty and violence towards foreign migrants, who were seen to be encroaching on the already limited resources of the locals. Political analysts, the media and academics alike turned their attention to the ‘hotspots’ of the bloodshed, notably Alexandra, but what was overlooked in this process was the townships, like Khutsong, where no incidents of xenophobic hostility were recorded. While it may seem peculiar to ask questions about why there were no brutal attacks on foreign migrants in some townships—particularly when several analysts are rushing to understand why there was—probing into why there were no attacks on immigrants in Khutsong offers insights into the response of South African civil society to the xenophobic violence of May 2008.

2. This article examines three issues that are of central concern to the question of why there were no attacks on immigrants in Khutsong in May 2008. The first of these relates to the way in which material demands were framed. In Khutsong, a protracted cross-border demarcation dispute was couched within the discourse of poor service delivery, and the target of the residents’ anger was the local government rather than the presence of foreign migrants. Second, the border dispute emphasized a notion of belonging that grants primacy to provincial boundaries (regardless of residents’ citizenship status or place of origin), whereas elsewhere, insiders and outsiders were distinguished, in large part, on the basis of their nationality. The third issue relates to the role of local leadership in giving direction to and shaping the attitudes and behaviour of residents. This study suggests that local leaders were decisive in the border dispute and in stemming the violence against foreign nationals in May 2008.

3. The following are key issues and recommendations for strengthening civil society responses to ongoing threats of xenophobia and challenges of local development in Khutsong.

COSATU’s Responses to Xenophobia

2010-01-27T02:22:00.000-08:00

Mondli Hlatshwayo

University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Part I: Executive Summary
1. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is an essential part of South African civil society because it is has the largest representation of organised workers and also a history of struggle against apartheid in the workplace and the townships. The democratic dispensation and post-apartheid era pose political and organisational challenges for COSATU and its affiliates. Besides a necessity to organise vulnerable workers in the “formal” and “informal” economy, it also has to address the question of xenophobia and issues pertaining to the rights of migrant workers. Migrant workers also form part of the category of vulnerable workers in the “formal” and “informal” economy.

2. The research findings demonstrate that certain COSATU’s provincial structures, through defending the human rights of migrants, played an important role in providing humanitarian aid to victims of xenophobia in May last year. The challenge is that COSATU and its affiliates did not have a co-ordinated intervention during the xenophobic attacks last years. This would have assisted in pushing back the frontiers of xenophobia. With all its limitations, the federation and its affiliates also appealed to its members and the society at large to defend the human rights of migrants. Despite the International Trade Union Confederation – African Regional Organisation (ICFTU-AFRO) report which indicates that unions are duty bound to organize migrants and safeguard their rights and interests , COSATU has not developed a strategy for organising migrants . On a positive note, the recent COSATU Congress Resolution on xenophobia opens space for developing a platform for protecting the rights of migrants and migrant workers. This research has also revealed that there are individual shop stewards and organisers who are acting as key defenders of the rights of migrants workers. They are driven by the spirit of international solidarity which is one of the founding principles of COSATU. It is the duty of COSATU as a federation to generalise the good deeds of these individuals. This would be part of entrenching its principle of international solidarity “within the South African borders”.

ONE CENTRE OF POWER

2010-01-27T02:17:00.000-08:00

The African National Congress and the Violence of May, 2008

Steven Friedman
Centre for the Study of Democracy
Rhodes University/ University of Johannesburg

Summary
While government representatives deplored the May, 2008, violence, government policy and practice helped to create a climate conducive to violence. But what was the role of the ANC? There is a distinction between ruling party and government and the active members of the governing party may have actively combated violence before and after it occurred. This paper examined the ANC’s role and concludes that it did not, in any significant way, depart from government policy. The ANC response was no more a counterweight to action against immigrants than that of the government.

A case study of The Gift of the Givers

2010-01-27T02:15:00.000-08:00

Ashwin Desai
University of Johannesburg, Centre for Sociological Research

Not what we give, But what we share,
For the gift without the giver Is bare.
James Russell Lowell

Executive Summary
1. GOG was one of the first civil society organizations to provide support to the victims of xenophobic attacks of May 2008. The article follows closely GOG’s support work once people had been moved to the camps. It seeks to quantify the kind of support GOG provided and evaluate the effects of this support. What the research reveals is that GOG was very effective in supplying much needed goods like blankets, mattresses, nappies and food and to keep this support going for a prolonged period. It also was able to draw on its media network to co-ordinate the collection of goods donated by the public and draw on the work of volunteers to both collect goods and co-ordinate its distribution. GOG also showed its flexibility in responding to the violence for example by diverting blankets collected for its annual “winter warmer campaign” to those living outside police stations and subsequently in the camps. However, what the research reveals is that while GOG supported people who wished to return to their home countries, it did not contemplate support for those who left the camps and who decided to stay on in South Africa. Through interviews with those displaced by the violence and who chose to stay behind the article illustrates their desperate circumstances. It is suggested that organizations like GOG need to consider ways in which their support work can continue beyond the barbed wire of the camp. The article also through the voice of one of a volunteer shows the incredible work that ordinary citizens played but how once the crisis was over organizations like GOG failed to integrate volunteers into their work despite the desire of some to continue to work with GOG.

Progressive humanitarian and social mobilisation in a neo-apartheid Cape Town: a report on civil society and the May 2008 xenophobic violence in Cape

2010-01-27T01:52:00.000-08:00

by Mazibuko K. Jara and Sally Peberdy

Part I: Executive Summary
1. The civil society response to the xenophobic violence of May 2008 in Cape Town was an effective channel that harnessed resources, provided food, shelter, and other material help, pressured government, mobilised hundreds of people as conscious volunteer, sought and managed donations from the public, and triggered renewed political consciousness and action in response to the xenophobic violence and subsequent displacement of people in the city. In the first days of the crisis, civil society essentially replaced the absent, incapable and dysfunctional state. In subsequent weeks and months it continued to provide humanitarian assistance, monitor conditions in the displacement camps and advocate for the rights of migrants challenging the state when it failed to meet basic minimum standards of care.

2. The wave of xenophobic violence that swept South Africa started on 11 May 2008 in Alexandra, Johannesburg. On 22 May attacks started in earnest in the Western Cape. In the following four days between 20,000-30,000 people were displaced in Cape Town following violence and threats. Thousands of others left the city. Almost all were black Africans from the rest of the continent but Indian, Pakistani and Chinese nationals were also affected. Violence occurred across the city, but mainly in informal settlements and townships. Smaller towns in the Western Cape were also affected.

3. The violence sits against the backdrop of a city marked by spatially and racially expressed deep socio-economic inequalities which reproduce apartheid geographies. In South Africa’s second largest city with a population of over 3 million, most working class and poor black and coloured residents live in overcrowded, under-serviced marginalised townships and informal settlements often far from economic and employment opportunities. Despite its relatively strong economy, in 2001 unemployment rates in informal settlements ranged from 50-60%. In 2005, nearly 40% of the population of Cape Town lived below the poverty line and 400,000 households lacked adequate formal housing. The situation has been exacerbated by insertion into the global economy, economic recession and neo-liberal economic and urban policies.

4. In the last 30 years the socio-economic geography of Cape Town has undergone major change as a result of internal migration. Since the removal of its status as a Coloured Labour Preference Area in 1985 over 800,000 black South Africans (mainly from the Eastern Cape) have moved to the city. Cross border migration from the rest of the continent has progressed at a slower pace, perhaps because of distance and the city’s history. There is no way of knowing how many foreigners live in Cape Town. Census 2001 found only 3% of the population were born outside South Africa and 1.2% in other African countries. These figures account for those who avoided enumeration and recent movements from Zimbabwe and elsewhere. African cross border migrants come from across the continent and include migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants. They work in elementary occupations and the service sector, are entrepreneurs, professionals and students.

5. The origins of the violence were symptomatic of wider problems in the South African socio-economic and political environment and not just xenophobia. The violence was seen to be underpinned by long-standing and unchallenged xenophobic attitudes and discrimination; lack of social cohesion and tolerance of diversity; perceived competition for resources in the face of deep inequality, poverty and slow service delivery; lack of leadership and competition for power in communities; lack of effective communication between the state and communities; a ‘culture of impunity’ in the use of violence to resolve disputes and crimes against foreigners; and exclusion of foreigners from participation in civil society; and a state which has been complicit in the victimisation of foreigners in part through its denial of the problem. A unique and longstanding feature of xenophobic violence in Cape Town has been its association with protecting the interests of South African shopkeepers in townships and informal settlements (e.g., Masiphumelele, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha).

6. Displaced African migrants and refugees fled to shelters provided by civil society, police stations and community halls. Many lost their homes, possessions, jobs, and businesses and children missed school. The city set up six camps to which some people were moved immediately and to which others were moved over the following weeks. With the exception of Youngsfield Military Base all were located at the edge of the city and far from peoples’ home and work. The policy of consolidating displaced people in camps (mega-sites), and conditions in the camps, was controversial and divisive. The experience of violence and displacement was gendered.

7. Civil society in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGOs/NPOs), Christian, Jewish and Muslim faith based organisations (FBOs), refugee and migrant organisations, COSATU and the SAHRC played a pivotal role in the response to the violence. They provided humanitarian, advocacy and legal assistance, sustaining the basic needs of displaced people even after the city and provincial governments had ostensibly started to act. One important attribute of the civil society response in Cape Town was how the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) brought to bear its well-organised social presence and a more advanced lobbying and advocacy strategy linked to using the law. The UNHCR played a significant role in the establishment and maintenance of the camps and their dissolution. The reponse of civil society can be characterised as humanitarian. Attempts to challenge xenophobia and wider issues underpinning the violence were limited. Legal challenges to improve conditions in camps and activities challenging xenophobia were controversial and created points of cleavage. The ANC, the SACP, the DA and other political parties were largely absent. The ANC seems to have played a contradictory role in different localities, at times possibly being active in the xenophobic violence and in others the contrary seems to be the case.

8. Tension between the city and the province hampered the impact of the civil society effort. For a month the Western Cape and Cape Town Disaster Management teams worked separately although both responded. However, not only was the state slow to respond at provincial and city levels it was at times obstructive reflecting the nature of the South African state as xenophobic, dysfunctional and ineffective. In retrospect, the state appreciates the role played by civil society. Since the crisis subsided from September 2008, the provincial government has developed a humanitarian assistance framework. However, it has not addressed its core failures in response to the crisis and migration issues in general.

9. Civil society participated in seven committees/forums formed during the crisis to facilitate and coordinate the response. Only one survives. Legacies include strengthened relationships between organisations and cooperation between ILRIG, COSATU and the Ogoni Solidarity Forum to organise migrant workers. One of the most direct outcomes was the formation of the Social Justice Coalition (SJC). This was built on the back of significant social and political capital accumulated over 10 years of social mobilisation and other campaigning work done by the TAC. However, it has not sustained its initial momentum. Successful coalitions seem to need clear and accessible goals around which to initiate concrete campaigns.

10. Despite the impressive levels of civil society intervention, there is little integration of xenophobia and integration of migrant and refugee issues or migrants themselves in work done by the majority of civil society organisations in Cape Town – except among the limited number of organisations which were already working with migrants and refugees and refugee organisations. The majority of these efforts are limited when viewed against the systemic foundations of xenophobia.

11. The Treatment Action Campaign played a massive role in the response of civil society to the xenophobic violence of May 2008, not only in its own activities but in coordinating the response of civil society. For the first few days their disaster relief operation was the main and largest response to the crisis in the city. Key features of their role included: initiating the establishment of, and leading a broader civil society task team; responding to developments in the camps and government (municipal and provincial) decisions and failures; interacting with “refugee leadership”, other NPOs, the government and media; mobilising thousands of its members; organising public political action; ensuring international standards were met in the camps.

12. The response of TAC, and particularly its Khayelitsha District branch reflect the importance of principles – promotion of and respect for social equality, human rights and dignity; consultation with displaced people; giving displaced people a voice; and operating in a culture of non-violence to effective humanitarian response which because it does not only look at “basic needs” but addresses the socio-economic and political context is most effective. Furthermore, the role of the TAC branch in Khayelitsha in the response demonstrates the importance of having organisations which are rooted in communities as well as “what a group of organised citizens can do.” However, it should be noted that their response caused tensions among sections of the organisation who were concerned that the core work of the organisation was being lost as well as between TAC and some other civil society organisations who felt the role they played was too politicised and too strong.

13. Masiphumelele is a poor and small township and informal settlement close to wealthy Fishoek and Noordhoek and the previously coloured township of Ocean View in the southern Peninsula. It is a fraught locality with high unemployment, low incomes and where over 90% of households live in informal dwellings. It demonstrates how the social crisis of reproduction is located in working class zones. The importance of small business associations and the targeting of Somali shopkeepers indicate how circuits of capital are also of concern. Masiphumelele experienced violence in 2006 as well as in 2008. The experience of reconciliation in 2006/7 while it did not prevent the violence of 2008, meant that the attacks in 2008 were short-lived and the displaced people were among the first to return to their homes, invited to by a delegation of community leaders Masiphumelele. Unlike many other communities in Cape Town, the ANC, the ANCYL, the YCL and the SACP have a history of good anti-xenophobia activism in Masiphumelele, but it is not universally supported in each of these organisations.

14. Civil society responded by meeting humanitarian needs of displaced people and advocating to ensure minimum standards of care and to protect the rights of the displaced. Attempts to develop a more progressive politicised activist response to challenge xenophobia were controversial reflecting the characterisation of the crisis by most of civil society and government as a humanitarian disaster. Yet this characterisation to the need to reflect on the underpinnings of the humanitarian crisis caused by the xenophobic violence in May 2008 and the effectiveness of solely relying on a humanitarian response. The response highlighted a general lack of integration of citizens and foreigners within civil society organisations and their activities. Many of the issues raised by this exploration of the response of civil society to the xenophobic violence point to lessons to be learned about mobilisation for social change on a wider scale and provides points where South Africans and foreigners can act together. These issues include lack of social cohesion, intolerance of diversity lack of progressive activist organisation and leadership to channel the voices and frustrations of communities, and disturbingly high levels of violence in poor communities, which sit against the deep inequalities, marginalisation and poverty found in South African urban areas, the reproduction of neo-apartheid urban geographies.

15. The report is based on research undertaken in 2009. It involved a review of relevant literature and newspapers, interviews with members of civil society organisations and provincial and city government involved in the response as well as focus group discussions with TAC members and community members in Masiphumelele.

The response of churches to the violence of 2008

2010-01-14T05:12:00.000-08:00

“Jesus was once a refugee. We were giving to God – a vital part of our ministry”

“We felt, as God’s servants and ambassadors of Christ, where we take our stand – we felt we had to be that catalyst and really come in there with an attitude of peace and assisting government …”

Researched and written by Sizwe Phakathi of the Gauteng City Region Observatory

1. Churches in South Africa and Africa as a whole have long been fighting injustice against the humankind. This was particularly the case in South Africa’s liberation struggle. Churches alone and in coalition with other civil society organisations responded to the xenophobic attacks in various ways, in some cases involved in very high-profile work. They provided premises for shelter, mobilised volunteers, raised funds and garnered supplies. This case study discusses the response of Christian churches to the xenophobic violence from the perspectives of pastors and church members who were directly involved.

2. The case study concludes and recommends that there is a need for the South Africa government to partner with churches and other faith-based organisations in tackling service delivery and creating cohesive, caring and enabling communities for sustainable development.

‘Many shades of the truth’ – The Ramaphosa case study

2010-01-14T05:01:00.000-08:00

Nobayethi Dube

Part I: Executive Summary

1. Ramaphosa is a township situated in the East Rand under Ekurhuleni municipality. The township is part of Ward 42. In May 2008, Ramaphosa experienced violence which has been described as quite intense by some analysts as well as newspapers. A number of people lost their dwellings, were displaced and some were killed. There are a number of complex findings in the research particularly when it comes to what led to the violence – simply put – everyone has their own version of what happened. The research also shows that the community of Ramaphosa is uncertain about whether the violence will take place and feels alone.

2. The research found that the churches, community based organisations and ordinary citizens particularly from Reiger Park provided assistance. The churches from Reiger Park were the most organised. On 17 May 2008 they became aware that a number of displaced foreign nationals had taken refuge at the Reiger Park police station. An sms was sent out by one of the church leaders informing them of what was happening. A task team was set up to look at the different areas such as feeding the displaced, medical attention counselling and so on. The task team went as far as assisting those that wanted to go back to their countries.

‘Business as Usual’: Understanding the response of the corporate sector to xenophobic violence

2009-11-27T05:46:00.000-08:00

By Annsilla Nyar
Gauteng City Region Observatory (GCRO)

Part I: Executive Summary

1. This work set out to fulfil two principal objectives: to investigate the contribution of the corporate sector with particular reference to the mining sector with its reliance on foreign labour, and thereafter to reflect on civil society’s response to the xenophobic violence of May 2008. Explicitly in terms of the future, this work looks to offer insights into the future of civil society activism as reflected through the lens of the xenophobic violence.

2. The starting point of this work is the large scale mass mobilization and activism of various parts of civil society following the May 2008 xenophobic violence. This paper conveys an understanding of the corporate sector’s stance of serious concern about the a situation often described as ‘simmering’ and ‘potentially destabilising’ but nonetheless resistant against more meaningful interventions by a prevailing sense of pragmatism and a limited and apolitical understanding of its role and responsibilities as a key stakeholder in society. It raises broader questions about the developmental and transformative responsibilities of corporate capital in South Africa vis a viz its compatibility and ‘fit’ with issues of social justice.

3. This study identified a number of findings:
• The response to the xenophobic violence, has helped to create an understanding of the comparative advantage of civil society organizations to deliver at local level, but also to lobby and advocate
• The corporate sector response was primarily about short term emergency assistance by means of a small number of financial contributions as well as in kind donations.
• The xenophobic violence had limited impacts upon the operating environment of business.
• The rationale of business for intervention or the lack of it, is related directly to matters of pragmatism/self interest and a belief that it is not the mandate of business to intervene
• A general perception exists amongst both civil society and corporate sector stakeholders of the limitations of the state as a vehicle for social change and there are serious concerns in both civil society and the corporate sector about the efficiencies of state delivery mechanisms.
• Civil society’s scope for meaningful partnership with the corporate sector appears to be limited

‘That violence was just the beginning…’

2009-11-25T22:35:00.000-08:00

Views on ‘foreigners’ and the May 2008 xenophobic violence as expressed in focus groups staged at the time
David Everatt, October 2009

Part I: Summary
1. In the period April to July 2008, Strategy & Tactics was commissioned to run a series of 22 focus groups, to discuss socio-political issues. The client gave permission for the data to be re-analysed for this project, given the fact that the groups provided a fascinating window onto attitudes to xenophobia just before and after the violence broke out.

2. Virtually all the groups conducted prior to the May 2008 violence exhibited high levels of hostility towards ‘foreigners’, higher than in any previous cycle of focus groups (which have been staged in the run-up to all elections post-1994). They were usually among the first issues raised when the groups were given an open-ended question to start discussion, namely ‘Let us start off talking about what has been happening in South African since the general election four years ago, in 2004. If we think about everything that is going on in the country, what are you most concerned about? What is the main issue that you think about, or talk about with your friends or family?’. The top three issues raised by groups – all the groups - were unemployment, crime and foreigners. These often intersected – participants felt that unemployment was a cause of crime and ‘foreigners’ were taking jobs away from South Africans; and that violent crime was brought to South Africa by ‘foreigners’.

3. The linkages were clear – crime/foreigners, or poor service delivery/foreigners get RDP houses; or corrupt officials/foreigners bribe them; or unemployment/foreigners accept lower wages; and so on. For every negative, the link to foreigners was made by participants in the groups.

4. Across race and class boundaries, hostility to foreigners – to black foreigners, more specifically – was endemic. Poor service delivery and/or poverty no doubt contributed to the flash-points but there was a general level of hostility that cut right across the social fabric as evidenced by these groups. As the report shows, discourse around ‘foreigners’ linked closely to an on-going discourse about South Africa having ‘too many rights’ and becoming ‘lawless’ as a result. This in turn linked to an appalling retrospective yearning for influx control – foreigners, participants repeatedly asserted, were not the problem: it was the massive influx, the sheer number, all “sucking on the system”, that was the problem; and influx control was the solution.

5. Some of the anti-foreigner discourse was simply racist. Foreigners – black foreigners – werw blamed for a remarkable array of social ills, summed up by a woman from Orange Farm:

We don’t want these foreigners. They are taking our children’s jobs. They are the ones committing rape. Girls drink so much liquor because they are being bribed by the foreigners with money.
(African female, 50-59, Orange Farm)

6. But with the racism came introspection, questions about race and identity, among black South Africans in particular. Some noted that racism has become endemic among blacks as it was amongst whites; others wondered why “we black people have a pull-down syndrome” and don’t like to see others succeed; others sounded close to despair:

I don’t have hope in black people. They could change things a bit but they are corrupt.
(African female, 18-25, informal dwelling, Kliptown)

7. The second set of groups was staged in July/August 2008, after the violence had receded. Here participants were asked two specific questions, whether they felt the issues that led to the xenophobic violence had been dealt with, and whether they felt the violence might recur. The xenophobic violence had not ended, as far as participants were concerned. Only one group (and not all participants in it) thought the violence had ended; every other participants and group felt it had merely quietened down but that the issues had not been resolved and neither had the violence. The obvious response is to wonder why the violence did indeed die down, if tempers were so high?

8. The second phase of groups occurred after the violence and the building of camps for displaced persons. In a sad twist, the camps themselves became a focus of envy:

I am not against foreigners….really, I have nothing against foreigners. Our government is too accommodating when it comes to foreigners. When we watch TV in our neighbours’ houses we are amazed to see government providing free food for foreigners when we are also hungry but are not catered for. Government provides foreigners with free maize meal but fails to do the same for us so that we can be able to feed our children. Our children go to bed on empty stomachs on some days.

Government gives foreigners preferential treatment; it is too accommodating towards foreigners. Last week my children and I went to bed hungry for three days; government would not offer us any help even if we approached them for help. Government does not provide us with free maize meal.
(African female, 40-49, unemployed, Evaton backyard shacks)

I say this thing [xenophobia] will never end. They take those people even to church as if they feel pity for them - in the meantime we are suffering. We live in one-roomed houses, in the meantime they are living comfortably. These people working for the government are the ones selling these houses and these outsiders have money. They sell these houses for something like R2 000 to these foreigners. That is why these people are occupying houses that are supposed to belong to South Africans.

It won’t end. These foreigners were chased out of their houses. Now they are told to go back to their houses and if they do and they identify the people who attacked them people will be arrested. Do you see now that this won’t end?
(African female, 30-39, unemployed, Alexandra)

9. Amongst other issues, participants wanted foreigners deported; wanted influx control to manage their entry and movement; believed foreigners bribe their way especially into RDP housing; argued that government is too soft on foreigners; Home Affairs officials in particular are open to corruption involving foreigners; and so on, a litany of anger and unhappiness.

10. In moments of introspection, respondents would argue that foreigners work hard while South Africans are lazy, which (they argue) will be among the reasons for violence flaring up again, as the following sequence illustrates:

I cannot deny what she is saying; Johannesburg is filthy, there are too many of them here and that they are making Johannesburg dirty. When foreigners started flocking to South Africa we were not doing anything to uplift ourselves, we were confused and had no idea how to make money. This changed when they arrived; truly speaking they showed us means through which to make money, they gave us a light in that regard.

They are self-employed and are hard workers. When we saw what they were doing we soon realised that we can also do the same and make money in the process. Most of them own hair salons and plait people’s hair for a fee; now we want to do the same thing which is why we don’t want them here anymore. Now that we are aware that plaiting hair is a means to make money we don’t want competition so we want them to go back to their countries so that we can use their ideas to make money. When they first arrived they found us doing nothing now we have realised that there are more ways to make money.
Yes; it is like we were blind and they have opened our eyes.
We are jealous.
They have woken us up, we were sleeping.
(African female, 40-49, unemployed, Mofolo/Soweto central)

11. Above all, respondents – from unemployed to professionals, across all race groups – complained that foreigners accept low wages and crowd South Africans out of the labour market. Professionals complained of Zimbabwean engineers who were both talented and cheap, while others noted that foreigners would take any job at any wage, which South Africans would not do. This mingled with common complaints about both casualisation of labour and the use of labour agents

12. Only one group failed to raise the issue at all; and only one individual (out of the +-120 people in the first round of groups) reminded others of the positive aspects that they should be remembering, that “we need to accommodate these people because they are Africans” – but immediately went on to note that “The only thing I’m concerned about is the influx of these people”. In this context – where the best the participants could manage was a single ‘yes, but…’ – ideas about integration seem light years away from the reality on the ground.

Introduction

2009-11-16T02:54:00.000-08:00

In May 2008 South Africa was horrified as more than 70 people were killed and tens of thousands driven from their homes and displaced, in a country-wide outbreak of xenophobic violence, directed at foreign, mostly African nationals; but also at black South Africans.

The violent outbreak saw a remarkable response by civil society to the crisis. Humanitarian relief was provided by faith-based organisations, trade unions, social movements, non-profit organisations, the general public and others.

In 2009 The Atlantic Philanthropies commissioned Strategy & Tactics (S&T) to assess the response of South African civil society to the xenophobic violence and the implications for the future of civil society. S&T worked in partnership with the Gauteng City-Region Observatory, the Centre for Sociological Research at the University of Johannesburg, the University of the Western Cape and members of the Amandla Forum, and the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Karuti Kanyinga of South Consulting has also joined the team.

In the first phase of the project, 18 papers were written by a range of academics and researchers. The papers looked at the responses of specific sectors such as faith based organisations, trade unions, the ANC, COSATU and the corporate sector. Case studies explore responses where xenophobic violence was extreme – in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape; and places where it was averted, such as Khutsong.

The next phase of the project will include workshops with civil society organisations in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town to be held in January and February 2010. It will also see greater input by migrant civil society organisations and members, and a broader regional perspective looking at ethnic/xenophobic violence in the Great Lakes region and Kenya, as well as civil society responses in those places.

This blog has been created to generate discussion and thinking prior to the workshops. The blog will be hosted until March 2010 and will over the next few months include the executive summaries of the papers that have been written, as well as conference details. We encourage you to engage and share your reflections and opinions on the findings. Once the research is complete, it will be issued as a technical report; a policy booklet with summaries and recommendations; and, later, will be published as a book.